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INTRODUCTION 
For most of the twentieth century, Americans left urban centers for 
suburban landscapes.1 
[O]ver the last one hundred years, American land use policy [was] designed 
to segregate uses of land, reduce population density, and facilitate the use of 
automobiles . . . . [S]uburban sprawl has come to represent the American 
dream, where citizens can own a home, two-car garage, both back and front 
yards, and if you are truly lucky, a pool.2 
Indeed, an antiurban attitude is ingrained in the American psyche.3 
Americans’ deeply rooted desire for independence coupled with an abundant 
supply of low-priced land created a low-density land use pattern.4 The growth 
of affordable automobiles in the twentieth century allowed for satisfaction of 
the deeply ingrained American desire to spread out.5 Consequently, 
Americans fled urban areas for the suburbs.6 The proliferation of low-density 
 
1 See MARK MATHER, KELVIN POLLARD & LINDA A. JACOBSEN, POPULATION REFERENCE 
BUREAU: FIRST RESULTS FROM THE 2010 CENSUS 15 fig.6 (2011), http:// 
www.prb.org/pdf11/reports-on-america-2010-census.pdf [http://perma.cc/FN89-UCA2] (showing 
that 7% of America’s population lived in suburbs in 1910, compared with 51% in 2010). But see John 
McIlwain, Suburbs 2.0: The Evolving American Suburb, URBAN LAND (June 1, 2011), 
http://urbanland.uli.org/economy-markets-trends/suburbs-2-0-the-evolving-american-suburbs/ 
[http://perma.cc/UFH7-BC63] (“The rapid growth on the furthest edges of metropolitan regions is 
a continuation of a pattern six decades old; what is new is the resurgence of the innermost ring of 
suburbs in the last decade. This new pattern of suburban growth, where both the innermost and 
outermost parts of the region are growing rapidly, has provided evidence to both those who believe 
that the suburbs will continue to grow forever outward in the years ahead, and to those who believe 
that the suburbs have reached an inflection point where most growth will shift to the closer-in parts 
of metropolitan regions.”). 
2 Timothy Polmateer, Note, How Localism’s Rationales Limit New Urbanism’s Success and What 
New Regionalism Can Do About It, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1085, 1087 (2014). See generally KENNETH 
T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES (1985) 
(describing the history of suburban sprawl in the United States and outlining how attaining a 
suburban lifestyle has come to define success in American culture). 
3 See Polmateer, supra note 2, at 1086 (“[Thomas] Jefferson believed urban living was 
detrimental to the health of society and preferred other forms of settlement.”). 
4 See James A. Kushner, Smart Growth, New Urbanism, and Diversity: Progressive Planning 
Movements in America and Their Impact on Poor and Minority Ethnic Populations, 21 UCLA J. ENVTL. 
L. & POL’Y 45, 46 (2002) (“American growth patterns have been driven by natural and unnatural 
forces. Vast amounts of land tended to foster individualism, privacy, and noncontiguous, non-
compact land use patterns.”). 
5 See JAMES HOWARD KUNSTLER, THE GEOGRAPHY OF NOWHERE: THE RISE AND 
DECLINE OF AMERICA’S MAN-MADE LANDSCAPE 85-112 (1993) (explaining that Americans are 
“Car Crazy”). 
6 Id. 
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development typified by post–World War II suburbs is called sprawl.7 
Unfortunately, this low-density development is inefficient and causes a host 
of social and environmental problems.8 
City planners, environmentalists, and academics alike widely criticize the 
proliferation of suburban sprawl. These critics argue that sprawl is 
fundamentally problematic because it is unsustainable and destroys vibrant 
neighborhoods and communities.9 “Evidence of sprawl surrounds us . . . . 
[S]prawl consume[d] nearly six million acres of farmland annually [from 1954 
to 1974] . . . .”10 Sprawl makes us overly dependent on automobiles, “which 
imposes enormous costs and degrades our quality of life . . . [by] impos[ing] 
burdensome infrastructure costs”11 and creating a society stratified by 
“income, education, race, and ethnicity.”12 
This Comment assumes suburban sprawl is inimical to the common good 
and ought to be slowed and, if possible, reversed. My purpose is not to prove 
that there is a problem, but to explore a potential solution: Land Value 
Taxation (LVT). Finding a solution, however, begins with identifying the 
causes of the problem. Accordingly, Part I briefly examines single-use 
zoning’s contribution to the problem of sprawl, and concludes that New 
Urbanists are making tremendous progress toward reforming single-use 
zoning. I suggest that our current property tax system is another cause of 
sprawl and, given the success of zoning reform, ought to be the target of New 
Urbanist policy advocacy. Part II posits LVT as an alternative to our current 
single-rate tax system and explores LVT’s dual ability to incentivize denser 
development and disincentive land speculation at the suburban fringe. Part 
III concludes that LVT can be most effectively implemented at the regional 
level. 
I. SUBURBAN SPRAWL AND THE NEW URBANIST RESPONSE 
While a prolific social phenomenon like suburban sprawl is no doubt caused 
by a number of complex and overlapping factors, the greatest contributor to 
 
7 Id. 
8 See id. at 113-24 (detailing the environmental, social and economic cost of the exponential 
increase in the use of automobiles); Jeremy R. Meredith, Note, Sprawl and the New Urbanist Solution, 
89 VA. L. REV. 447, 452-66 (2003) (detailing the same costs for sprawl). 
9 See Timothy J. Dowling, Reflections on Urban Sprawl, Smart Growth, and the Fifth Amendment, 
148 U. PA. L. REV. 873 (2000) (arguing that the debate over whether or not sprawl is harmful is over, 
and suggesting that the time has come to argue about its cures, not its effects). 
10 Id. at 875; see also U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE 
UNITED STATES 597 (95th ed. 1974) (showing that the number of acres of farmland in the United 
States decreased by 119 million from 1954 to 1974). 
11 Dowling, supra note 9, at 875-76. 
12 Peter Mieszkowski & Edwin S. Mills, The Causes of Metropolitan Suburbanization, J. ECON. 
PERSP., Summer 1993, at 135, 137. 
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sprawl is single-use zoning. Local governments use zoning as the primary means 
to control land use.13 American zoning policy in the twentieth century created 
sprawl by using single-use zoning almost exclusively. Single-use zoning regulates 
the development of land based on the intended end use.14 It allows only one kind 
of use in a specified zone.15 Residential development is separated from 
commercial development, which is separated from industrial development. 
Mixed uses within a zone are prohibited; commercial activity is not permitted in 
residential zones and vice versa. 
The result of single-use zoning is that “residential zones cover large 
amounts of thinly populated land, [and] few people can live within walking 
distance of commercial zones.”16 Single-use zoning’s first article of faith is 
that the best and highest use of land is the single-family detached home, and 
that all other uses are inferior and thus must be kept separate.17 The Supreme 
Court upheld the practice of single-use zoning in its now iconic decision 
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.18 
The spread of single-use zoning was aided not only by local zoning 
ordinances, but also by state and federal policy. For example: 
[T]he federal government created the Federal Housing Administration 
(FHA)—an agency that subsidized home ownership by insuring private 
sector loans—but only for homes that met FHA standards. These standards 
prohibited gridded streets in residential neighborhoods, instead describing 
cul-de-sacs as “the most attractive form for family dwellings.” The FHA also 
recommended residential streets that were twenty-four to twenty-six feet 
wide—about 50% larger than some older streets. FHA standards also required 
long blocks and low densities. Because the majority of American mortgages 
were FHA-insured, the FHA minimum standards governed most new 
development. And local governments generally adopted rules based on FHA 
 
13 ROBERT C. ELLICKSON ET AL., LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS 57 (4th 
ed. 2013) (“The single most important mechanism by which local governments control land use is 
the zoning ordinance.”). 
14 Michael Lewyn, New Urbanist Zoning for Dummies, 58 ALA. L. REV. 257, 263 (2006) 
(“[S]ingle-use zoning (also known as ‘Euclidean zoning’ after the [1926] case which upheld that 
technique) became virtually universal.” (citations omitted)). 
15 Id. at 258.   
16 Id. 
17 ELLICKSON ET AL., supra note 13, at 63. The notion that residential uses must be kept separate 
from nonresidential uses emerged from a group of landscape architects operating on the European 
Continent in the late nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries—chief among them Le Corbusier. See 
KUNSTLER, supra note 5, at 71-73, 78; ROY LUBOVE, THE URBAN COMMUNITY: HOUSING AND 
PLANNING IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 1-22 (1967) (discussing the roots of urban planning). 
18 272 See U.S. 365 (1926) (upholding a local zoning ordinance that created six zones and 
allowed only a single use within each zone as a valid exercise of the enacting municipality’s police 
power). 
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standards, which meant that even homes not insured by the FHA were 
governed by FHA rules.19 
So, for much of the twentieth century, American land use policy at the 
local, state, and federal levels encouraged sprawl, accelerating the decline of 
walkable, mixed-use neighborhoods and leading to an increasingly stratified 
and automobile-dependent society. 
New Urbanism20 emerged as an anti-sprawl movement.21 Jane Jacobs, one 
of the earliest and harshest critics of single-use zoning, is in many ways the 
mother of New Urbanism.22 Jacobs argued single-use zoning destroys vibrant 
cities by “stifling the cross-fertilization of ideas and experiences that is so 
important to a city’s economic and social health”23 and that arises naturally in 
a dense and diverse city. Today, New Urbanists strongly criticize single-use 
zoning and urge a switch to mixed-use zoning, which “allows people to work 
and shop within walking distance of their homes . . . .”24 New Urbanists’ 
proposed pattern of development promotes a sense of community and reduces 
dependence on automobiles.25 New Urbanism seeks to create human-scaled, 
 
19 Lewyn, supra note 14, at 264-65 (footnotes omitted) (citing Michael Southworth & Eran 
Ben-Joseph, Regulated Streets: The Evolution of Standards for Suburban Residential Streets (Inst. of 
Urban and Reg’l Dev., Working Paper No. 593, 1993)). 
20 I use the term New Urbanism broadly to refer to the range of responses to single-use zoning 
and the resultant sprawl. See Joseph E. Gyourko & Witold Rybczynski, Financing New Urbanism 
Projects: Obstacles and Solutions, 11 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 733, 733 (2000) (explaining that New 
Urbanism is also referred to as “traditional neighborhood development, neotraditional development, 
and smart growth”). While each of these movements varies from the others in subtle ways, for the 
purposes of this Comment, their overall goals are sufficiently similar to warrant being lumped 
together. 
21 See Meredith, supra note 8, at 451 (explaining that New Urbanism “focuses primarily on 
spatial solutions to urban sprawl at the regional, neighborhood, and block level”); Polmateer, supra 
note 2, at 1095 (“New Urbanism attempts to manage development problems like sprawl . . . .”). 
22 See JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES (1961); see also 
SULEIMAN OSMAN, THE INVENTION OF BROWNSTONE BROOKLYN: GENTRIFICATION AND 
THE SEARCH FOR AUTHENTICITY IN POSTWAR NEW YORK 173 (2011) (“If Le Corbusier was a 
guru for modernist urban planning students of the 1950s, Jane Jacobs was the founding mother of 
the New Urbanism . . . .”). 
23 Jay Wickersham, Jane Jacob’s Critique of Zoning: From Euclid to Portland and Beyond, 28 B.C. 
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 547, 550-51 (2001) (citing JACOBS, supra note 22, at 165-74). 
24 ELLICKSON ET AL., supra note 13 at 63; see also ANDRES DUANY ET AL., SUBURBAN 
NATION: THE RISE OF SPRAWL AND THE DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN DREAM 25 (2000) (“[In 
a traditional, mixed-use neighborhood, citizens] can live above the store, next to the store, five 
minutes from the store, or nowhere near the store, and it is easy to imagine the different age groups 
and personalities that would prefer each alternative. In this way and others, the traditional 
neighborhood provides for an array of lifestyles. In [single-use] suburbia, there is only one available 
lifestyle: to own a car and to need it for everything.”). 
25 Lewyn, supra note 14, at 258-59. 
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walkable, mixed-use development in which spontaneous human interaction is 
possible.26 
Not surprisingly, New Urbanists fought sprawl by attacking its wellspring: 
single-use zoning.27 New Urbanism categorically rejected the foundational 
value judgment of single-use zoning, namely, “that the appropriate way to 
order different land uses is to separate them from one another into single-use 
zones.”28 Instead, New Urbanists sought to regulate density rather than use 
by creating the “SmartCode”:29 
While ordinary zoning codes regulate a building’s character (e.g., its height, 
building and lot size, and parking facilities) by its use, the SmartCode 
regulates a building’s character by the urban intensity of its zone—it sets up 
one set of rules for buildings in each zone, regardless of whether the buildings 
are being used for residential or commercial purposes.30 
Surprisingly, New Urbanists have been successful in fighting single-use 
zoning and implementing the SmartCode.31 Indeed, “[d]uring the past forty 
years, the lessons taught by Jane Jacobs about urban form have largely been 
incorporated into land-use regulation.”32 The role of zoning is transforming. 
Rather than separating uses, zoning is now most often used “in the service of 
promoting walkable, mixed-use neighborhoods connected by transit.”33 Cities 
 
26 See id. (laying out the principles of New Urbanism); see also CONG. FOR THE NEW 
URBANISM, CHARTER OF THE NEW URBANISM (2001),  http://www.cnu.org/sites/default/ 
files/charter_english.pdf [http://perma.cc/44 ZV-V4ZV] (same). 
27 See J. Peter Byrne, The Rebirth of the Neighborhood, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1595, 1597 (2013) 
(listing zoning reform as one of the three chief tools of New Urbanists). 
28 Nicole Stelle Garnett, Ordering (and Order in) the City, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1, 4 (2004). 
29 The SmartCode is one example of the more generic form-based codes used by New 
Urbanists, but since both regulate density rather than use, I use the terms interchangeably. See 
ELLICKSON ET AL., supra note 13, at 63 (“The movement in favor of form-based zoning likewise 
deemphasizes segregation of uses in favor of specifying urban forms or physical layouts that might 
encompass mixed-uses like retailers in close proximity to residences.”). Notably, form-based codes 
do still regulate some non-compatible uses like heavy industry and residential housing. See generally 
DANIEL G. PAROLEK ET AL., FORM BASED CODES: A GUIDE FOR PLANNERS, URBAN 
DESIGNERS, MUNICIPALITIES, AND DEVELOPERS 12 (2008) (“[W]hile FBCs [form-based codes] 
differ radically from conventional zoning in many ways, they are similar in a few ways. FBCs also 
isolate noxious uses, such as heavy manufacturing and airports, and they generally only regulate 
private buildings as they affect the public good, leaving plentry of room for individual tastes and 
styles. As necessary, they may also contain provisions similar to conventional zoning for such issues 
as non-conforming uses and affordable housing.”). 
30 Lewyn, supra note 14, at 269. 
31 See Tony Perez, Top 10 Misconceptions About Form-Based Codes, BETTER CITIES AND 
TOWNS, Sept.–Oct. 2014, at 1, 1 (“Since 1981, approximately 400 form-based codes (FBCs) have 
been prepared for communities across the [United States], and as of 2012, 252 of them have been 
adopted. Eighty-two percent of the adoptions have taken place in the past 10 years.”). 
32 Byrne, supra note 27, at 1598. 
33 Id. 
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are now “permitting greater mixing of uses on a single site . . . . This trend 
now culminates in form-based coding . . . .”34 
That zoning is decreasingly an impediment to New Urbanism is 
astounding given that less than twenty years ago, “virtually everything [New 
Urbanists] want[ed] to do [was] . . . . illegal.”35 Indeed, in 2006, Chad 
Emerson wrote his now seminal article Making Main Street Legal Again: The 
SmartCode Solution to Sprawl.36 In his opening line, Emerson boldly claimed: 
Under zoning codes in much of the United States today, building a project 
similar to classic American communities such as Charleston, Savannah, Key 
West, or Alexandria, would be illegal. Many zoning codes also prohibit the 
creation of a neighborhood with a traditional corner store or a classic 
American main street where the shopkeeper lived above her shop.37 
It is therefore truly amazing that less than a decade later, the SmartCode 
has made so much progress in American land use planning. 
Zoning reform, however, is a necessary but not sufficient element in 
achieving the New Urbanist agenda.38 In fact, it is only the frontier. As 
municipalities and communities across America continue to adopt form-
based codes, the New Urbanist movement should look to new policy 
initiatives that can create a better built environment. Now is the time to start 
planning for a future in which zoning codes are not an impediment to New 
Urbanism. Accordingly, this Comment proposes the Land Value Tax (LVT) 
as the next major initiative New Urbanists should pursue. The Land Value 
Tax is not a new concept; it is not even a new concept for New Urbanists.39 
This Comment, however, makes the additional argument that LVT is most 
effectively implemented at the regional or metropolitan level. Given the 
success of New Urbanist zoning reforms, the time is ripe to plan the future of 
the movement, and a Land Value Tax is a key component in a comprehensive 
New Urbanist legal regime. Land Value Taxation must become a club in the bag 
of New Urbanist policy. 
 
34 Id. at 1599. 
35 Jerry Frug, The Geography of Community, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1047, 1093 (1996). 
36 Chad D. Emerson, Making Main Street Legal Again: The SmartCode Solution to Sprawl, 71 MO. 
L. REV. 637 (2006). 
37 Id. at 637. 
38 See Thomas A. Gihring, Incentive Property Taxation: A Potential Tool for Urban Growth 
Management, 65 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N. 62, 62 (1999) (noting that “[r]arely have [New Urbanists] 
looked beyond regulations [like zoning] for solutions to the twin problems of urban sprawl and 
central city stagnation” and proposing a focus on a revised property tax as an additional tool). 
39 See id. (providing an example of a New Urbanist suggesting LVT as a means of achieving 
New Urbanist goals). 
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II. LAND VALUE TAX40 
A. The History and Theory 
Nearly every jurisdiction in the United States employs a single-rate property 
tax system—that is, they tax land and improvements to land (i.e. buildings) at 
the same rate.41 Thus, “property tax is actually two types of taxes—one on 
building values, and the other on land values.”42 Henry George, a nineteenth 
century politician, criticized this two-rate approach as inefficient and unjust.43 As 
a superior alternative, George proposed eliminating the tax on building values in 
favor of a single tax on land values.44 For a little over a century now, George and 
his followers have been advocating LVT as an equitable and efficient alternative 
to the current single-rate property tax system.45 
Proponents of LVT criticize the manner in which the single-rate system 
combines two taxes into a unitary property tax because “the property tax is, 
economically speaking, a combination of one of the worst taxes—the part that 
is assessed on real estate improvements . . . and one of the best taxes—the tax 
 
40 A threshold question not addressed in this Comment is whether LVT’s different treatment 
of land and buildings violates a state constitution’s uniformity clause. See J. Anthony Coughlan, Land 
Value Taxation and Constitutional Uniformity, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 261, 262 (1999) (describing a 
state constitution’s uniformity clause as a “constitutional requirement that taxes upon the same 
classes of subjects be uniform,” which “may forbid the subclassification of real property into land 
and improvements”). Indeed, in Pennsylvania, the only state to experiment broadly with LVT, the 
issue has not come up despite Pennsylvania’s use of LVT for over a century. See id. (“[T]here are no 
reported rulings directly regarding the constitutionality of a two-tiered real property tax.”). To the 
best of my knowledge, this remains the case today. Nevertheless, after surveying the relevant 
Pennsylvania case law, Coughlan concludes LVT does not violate Pennsylvania’s uniformity clause. 
Id. at 269; see also PA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (“All taxes shall be uniform, upon the same class of 
subjects, within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax, and shall be levied and collected 
under general laws.”). Coughlan does speculate, however, that fifteen other states’ uniformity 
clauses, read literally, are unlikely to allow LVT. See Coughlan, supra, at 291. Obviously, if LVT is 
unconstitutional in certain states, switching to it becomes politically and practically difficult. 
41 See Jeffrey P. Cohen & Cletus C. Coughlin, An Introduction to Two-Rate Taxation of Land and 
Buildings, 87 FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 359, 359, 366 (2005). 
42 Alana Hartzok, Pennsylvania Farmers and the Split-Rate Tax, in LAND-VALUE TAXATION: 
THE EQUITABLE AND EFFICIENT SOURCE OF PUBLIC FINANCE 239, 239 (Kenneth C. Wenzer 
ed., 1999). 
43 See generally HENRY GEORGE, PROGRESS AND POVERTY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE CAUSE 
OF INDUSTRIAL DEPRESSION AND OF THE INCREASE OF WANT WITH INCREASE OF WEALTH; 
THE REMEDY 403-29 (Robert Schalkenbach Found. 1935) (1879). “[R]ent should, both on grounds 
of expediency and justice, be the peculiar subject of taxation …. [A]ll taxation should be abolished 
save a tax upon the value of land.” Id. at 423-24. 
44 See id. at 431-73 (justifying a single tax on land with reference to the tax’s effect on the 
production and distribution of wealth, on individuals and classes, and on social organization and 
social life). 
45 See LAND VALUE TAXATION: THE EQUITABLE AND EFFICIENT SOURCE OF PUBLIC 
FINANCE (Kenneth C. Wenzer ed., 1999) (collecting essays advocating for a switch to LVT). 
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on land or site value . . . .”46 These critics complain that the single-rate system 
“punishes anyone who puts up a decent building made of durable materials” 
by encouraging land speculation, shoddy construction, and underutilization.47 
The tax on buildings is problematic because it is a tax on production. 
Buildings exist to help people accomplish tasks. When a company constructs 
a building, it does so because it thinks the building will help it be more 
profitable. The building is part of the company’s production costs just like 
labor or equipment. When a building is taxed at the same rate as the land on 
which it sits, there is a strong disincentive for the company to expend capital 
to improve the land unless the improvement’s value is greater than the 
increase in the tax burden on the land.48 Thus, taxing buildings, even though 
they are a cost of production, raises the costs of goods and therefore reduces 
the supply. Thus, taxes on buildings are inefficient because they increase the 
cost of production, thereby driving down demand for that item. Put simply: 
the higher the tax rate on buildings, the fewer buildings there will be.49 
Conversely, a tax on the value of land is efficient because, unlike the quantity 
of buildings, the quantity of land is fixed; therefore, an increase in the tax rate on 
land cannot result in a decrease in its supply.50 The only way to offset an increase 
in the tax rate of land is to increase the production of the land.51 
As the tax rate on land increases, landowners have a strong incentive to 
make capital improvements to land that will produce enough revenue to offset 
the higher taxes.52 “[B]y penalizing non-production, [taxing land] encourages 
 
46 William Vickrey, Simplification, Progression, and a Level Playing Field, in LAND VALUE 
TAXATION: THE EQUITABLE AND EFFICIENT SOURCE OF PUBLIC FINANCE, supra note 45, at 17, 
17; see also RICHARD F. DYE & RICHARD W. ENGLAND, LINCOLN INST. OF LAND POL’Y, 
ASSESSING THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF LAND VALUE TAXATION 4 (2010), https://www. 
lincolninst.edu/pubs/dl/1760_983_Assessing%20the%20Theory%20and%20Practice%20of%20Land
%20Value%20Taxation.pdf [https://perma.cc/CFL4-GKHS] [hereinafter ASSESSING THE 
THEORY] (“The traditional property tax is controversial because it is widely perceived to be unfair 
and regressive.”). 
47 JAMES HOWARD KUNSTLER, HOME FROM NOWHERE: REMAKING OUR EVERYDAY 
WORLD FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 197 (1996). 
48 Hartzok, supra note 42, at 239. 
49 See id. (arguing that a tax on buildings results in “lower production, higher prices, or both” 
(emphasis added)). 
50 See id. (“A tax on land cannot be avoided by producing less land, or by moving land from 
one jurisdiction to another.”). 
51 See id. at 239-40 (“Land is most certainly not a product of human labor but a gift of 
nature . . . . Unlike a levy on capital items, a tax on land is not a cost of production in itself but 
functions as a type of user fee which has the added advantage of encouraging efficient land use while 
curbing land speculation.”). 
52 See Mark Speirs, Land Value Taxation: An Underutilized Complement to Smart Growth 
Policies 38 (Dec. 13, 2010) (unpublished B.S. thesis, University of Pennsylvania) http://www. 
urbantoolsconsult.org/upload/markspeirsfinalpaper12-20.pdf [http://perma.cc/HQ37-M5GL] 
(stating that a tax on land does not affect the amount of the commodity that a firm produces and 
therefore is more efficient). 
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landowners to develop their land, thereby creating jobs and other benefits. It 
also reduces speculation, bringing land prices more into line to [sic] true 
market rates.”53 Accordingly, LVT proponents argue that land should be taxed 
at a much higher rate than improvements to land because such a tax will 
incentivize more efficient land usage.54 In sum, LVT provides landowners 
both a carrot and a stick. LVT’s carrot comes in the form of the benefit the 
tax system provides: if landowners put bigger buildings on their land, the 
value of those buildings will be taxed at a much lower rate than the land. 
LVT’s stick is that if a landowner holds land in an unproductive fashion and 
fails to make improvements, it will cost much more than under a single-rate 
system. 
LVT’s greatest virtue, however, is that it is a value capture tax. By taxing 
the value of land at a high rate, the public recaptures part of the value added 
to land through the expenditure of public funds for improvements like sewers 
and roads.55 By capturing the value of public expenditures, LVT eliminates a 
free rider problem caused by developers making money off tax expenditures 
meant to benefit the whole community.56 The value capture feature of LVT 
creates a more equitable distribution of tax burdens: “[O]wners of valuable 
land benefit from socially created value based on the location of their land, so 
under a system of [land-]value taxation the relation between tax paid and 
benefits received would be clear and proportional.”57 Under our current 
system of single-rate taxation “taxes may be (and often are) out of proportion 
with benefits received, which a normal person would rightfully construe as 
unfair.”58 Kunstler illustrates the intuitive fairness of LVT: “For instance, a 
homeowner whose [property tax] is increased because he decides to fix up his 
old house derives no increased benefit in municipal services. Why should he 
be penalized for taking care of his building?”59 In sum, LVT’s value capturing 
ability creates a more equitable and efficient property tax system. 
 
53 Id. at 15. 
54 See, e.g., KUNSTLER supra note 47, at 198-207. 
55 See Coughlan, supra note 40, at 266-67 (stating that LVT can be used to capture some or all 
of the value added to real property by government expenditures). 
56 See, e.g., Walter Rybeck, Transit-induced Land Values, 5 ECON. DEV. COMMENT. 23 (1981) 
(showing that the completion of Washington’s Metrorail system created windfalls for nearby 
developers, who could now charge rental premiums thanks to their newfound proximity to mass 
transit). For a hypothetical illustration of the free rider problem, see infra notes 69–70 (citing Speirs, 
supra note 52, at 20-25). 
57 KUNSTLER, supra note 47, at 202. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
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B. Why Land Value Taxation Accomplishes New Urbanist Goals 
1. Infill Development 
Because Land Value Taxation incentivizes more intensive use of land, 
switching to it would create the more dense walkable neighborhoods sought by 
New Urbanists.60 “A major objective of [New Urbanism] is to alter the spatial 
distribution of population and employment, principally by increasing the density 
and intensity of development . . . .”61 LVT accomplishes this objective by creating 
a strong incentive for infill development. Infill development is the process of 
“developing vacant or under-used parcels within existing urban [and suburban] 
areas that are already largely developed.”62 
LVT’s high tax rate on land rather than on buildings and improvements 
to land creates an incentive to build more improvements. It also creates 
disincentives to build structures that generate little revenue such as surface 
parking lots or large yards. In urban areas, where tax rates would increase the 
most under LVT given the high site-value of land, developers would be 
incentivized to make substantial improvements to their land in order to take 
advantage of the tax-favored status of improvements.63 Further, “vacant and 
underutilized sites would have heavy tax increases, thus providing financial 
incentives to bring about infill development and general upgrading.”64 
Indeed, the data from Pittsburgh—the only major city in the United States 
 
60 See Speirs, supra note 52, at 18 (stating that taxing land more heavily than building values 
promotes urban revitalization). 
61 GREGORY K. INGRAM ET AL., LINCOLN INST. OF LAND POL’Y, SMART GROWTH 
POLICIES: AN EVALUATION OF PROGRAMS AND OUTCOMES 135 (2009). 
62 Infill Development: Completing the Community Fabric, MUN. RES. SERV. CTR., 
http://mrsc.org/Home/Explore-Topics/Planning/Development-Types-and-Land-Uses/Infill-Devel 
opment-Completing-the-Community-Fabric.aspx [http://perma.cc/C8UD-M5PB] (last modified 
May 18, 2015) [hereinafter Infill Development]. Most municipalities and towns have many parcels of 
land that are either undeveloped or underdeveloped. Infill development seeks to utilize these 
parcels, creating a greater overall density, rather than simply “sprawling” to yet another undeveloped 
farm or plot of vacant land. Infill development aims to achieve more than scatter-shot development: 
by creating more dense land use, infill development creates more coherent neighborhoods. See id. 
(“Successful infill development is characterized by overall residential densities high enough to support 
improved transportation choices as well as a wider variety of convenience services and amenities. It can 
return cultural, social, recreational and entertainment opportunities, gathering places, and vitality to older 
centers and neighborhoods.”). But see J. Terrence Farris, The Barriers to Using Urban Infill Development to 
Achieve Smart Growth, 12 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 1, 8 (2001) (providing an overview of the disincentives 
for infill development). 
63 See Gihring, supra note 38, at 75 (“[C]apital investment in building improvements is 
rewarded through the incentive of lower taxes.”). 
64 Id. at 73. 
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to implement LVT—supports the conclusion that “the real power of [LVT] 
is to stimulate central city revitalization.”65 
LVT’s ability to incentivize infill development will also decrease urban 
blight by increasing the costs of leaving a building vacant. Vacant buildings 
and lots are a primary cause of urban blight, and “[a] significant portion of 
vacant buildings are owned by speculators who buy inner-city property 
cheaply in the hope that future development, whether spurred by the 
government or by private developers, will allow them to sell their land for a 
substantial profit.”66 Not surprisingly, these urban speculators hold land 
unproductively (by not building on it) because “most cities’ property taxes 
impose relatively low burdens on land holding, but heavy burdens on land 
using. By keeping buildings vacant, speculators pay less in taxes while 
avoiding the problems of dealing with tenants.”67 What’s more, even when 
these vacant properties do have improvements, “[m]aintenance is typically 
ignored ‘because it does not affect actual property prices in a way that makes 
speculation more profitable.’”68 Under an LVT regime, however, the holding 
costs of vacant land will increase, and speculators will be forced to at least use 
the property for a purpose that generates enough revenue to pay the taxes on 
the property. 
An example helps illustrate how LVT encourages infill development, 
especially in urban areas.69 Imagine an empty lot located in a city; the assessed 
value of the lot is $8360. A typical tax rate for this lot is 1.7%, or $142 annually. 
Thus, for roughly $12 a month, the owner of this lot can leave it vacant and 
hope its value increases. There is almost no incentive for the landowner to 
make any capital improvements to the land. Instead, the owner takes a wait-
and-see approach, hoping a major public works project or private 
development such as a hospital will drive up the value of the land (effectively 
free riding on such public or private investment). If that happens, the owner 
can sell the land for five or ten times its current value.70 Even taking a 
conservative estimate, the owner could sell the land for $40,000. With a tax 
burden of only $142 annually, the owner can afford to hold the property for 
fifteen or more years waiting for its value to increase and still make a 
handsome profit even discounted to present value. 
 
65 Id. (citing Wallace E. Oates & Robert M. Schwab, The Impact of Urban Land Taxation: The 
Pittsburgh Experience 22-25 (Ctr. for Inst. Reform and the Informed Sector, Working Paper No. 47, 
1992), http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNABP359.pdf [http://perma.cc/3SRH-V8EL]). 
66 David T. Kraut, Note, Hanging Out the No Vacancy Sign: Eliminating the Blight of Vacant 
Buildings from Urban Areas, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1139, 1152 (1999). 
67 Id. at 1152-53. 
68 Id. (quoting Hans Skifter Anderson, Motives for Investments in Housing Rehabilitation Among 
Private Landlords Under Rent Control, 13 HOUSING STUD. 177, 197 (1998)). 
69 This example is taken from Speirs, supra note 52, at 20-25. 
70 Id. at 20-21. 
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On the other hand, if, that same lot were located in a jurisdiction employing 
a pure LVT (no tax on improvements), and was taxed at a normal LVT rate of 
8.5%, the speculator’s holding costs increase to $710 a year—five times the 
holding cost under a single-rate system. The developer is now more likely to 
develop the property, at least to a level where it generates enough revenue to 
offset the increase in tax rate (from 1.7% to 8.5%). Thus, under an LVT regime, 
our hypothetical lot is more likely to be improved than under a two-rate system. 
This (overly simplified) example illustrates the ability of LVT to encourage 
infill development and reduce blight. 
In sum, LVT encourages infill development by reducing the tax on 
buildings, which facilitates new construction and replacement of obsolete 
buildings in urban areas. “Property owners, responding to the financial 
inducement to reduce the land-to-building value ratio, would build more 
intensively on vacant and underutilized sites.”71 The total effect over time in 
urban areas “would be to increase property values, and thus the tax base, 
where that is most needed.”72 
LVT’s infill-producing effect also ameliorates a challenge to early New 
Urbanist developments. Critics allege that New Urbanist developments are 
really just suburbs for yuppies who have traveled to Europe and are nostalgic 
for the streets of Paris or Berlin.73 Indeed, in their earliest iterations, New 
Urbanist communities had to be built at the outer limits of metropolitan areas 
because that was the only place where enough land could be assembled to re-
create the sufficiently densely built walkable mixed-use neighborhoods so 
favored by New Urbanists.74 Consequently, “[m]ost first generation New 
Urbanist developments appear to be suburban rather than urban; their only 
impact is to drain more wealth and tax base from the city.”75 
To reverse this trend, New Urbanists should focus on creating infill 
development.76 Indeed, “[t]he only strategy for generating a more affordable 
expanding housing supply is to establish a program of higher density 
development, predominantly targeted at urban infill development and around 
transit corridors throughout the region.”77 LVT incentivizes exactly this kind 
of development by raising the cost of surface parking and oversized lots for 
 
71 Gihring, supra note 38, at 63. 
72 Id. at 73-74. 
73 See Kushner, supra note 4, at 61 & n.71 (describing the locations after which New Urbanist 
developments are modeled). 
74 See Polmateer, supra note 2, at 1120 (“Critics suggest that most new urbanism development 
has occurred on the outskirts of metropolitan areas. As a result, those areas are quintessentially 
suburban.”). 
75 Kushner, supra note 4, at 65. 
76 Id. at 56. 
77 Id. 
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single-family dwellings. Thus, LVT promotes transit-oriented development,78 
which “protects lower-income populations from marginalization by offering 
mixed-income housing in a connected and socially and economically diverse 
setting.”79 
LVT can also help ensure that New Urbanism is accessible to people in all 
socioeconomic ranges and demographics. This is crucial for the success of 
New Urbanist communities. A critical tenet of the New Urbanist philosophy 
of neighborhoods is that communities should be diverse, leading to a rich 
tapestry and deep communal heritage.80 The denser, more walkable 
developments incentivized by LVT are attractive to minorities. A recent Pew 
Foundation study shows a divide among Americans regarding the ideal built 
environment: 48% prefer walkable, mixed-use settings while 49% prefer a 
more traditional suburban setting centered around a car.81 Of those surveyed, 
Hispanics, then African-Americans, were the most likely to prefer a denser 
built environment.82 Those with a college degree were more likely to prefer 
denser accommodations.83 Additionally, young adults and those over sixty-
five (particularly women) prefer a more walkable landscape.84 The conclusion 
gleaned from this data is that walkable neighborhoods are desirable to a diverse 
range of people. Thus, the creation of denser neighborhoods should result in 
diversity and create the vibrant neighborhoods New Urbanists seek.85 
LVT also reduces the price of housing, which helps ensure that the denser 
neighborhoods it incentivizes are mixed-income. LVT reduces the price of 
housing both on the supply side—by increasing the supply of housing—and 
on the demand side—by eliminating the tax on building improvements, thus 
lowering a homeowner’s tax burden.86 LVT increases the supply of housing 
by creating strong incentives to build more structures; invariably, some of 
 
78 See Speirs, supra note 52, at 32-35 (explaining how LVT creates transit-oriented development 
and the advantages of transit-oriented development). 
79 M. Tanner Clagett, If It’s Not Mixed-Income, It Won’t be Transit-Oriented: Ensuring Our Future 
Developments Are Equitable & Promote Transit, 41 TRANSP. L.J. 1, 2 (2014). 
80 See Rebecca R. Sohmer & Robert E. Lang, From Seaside to Southside: New Urbanism’s Quest 
to Save the Inner City, 11 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 751, 757-758 (2000) (explaining that New 
Urbanists seek to design neighborhoods that blend housing of different socioeconomic strata). 
81 Robert Steuteville, America Split Between Two Community Ideals, BETTER CITIES & TOWNS 
(June 13, 2014), http://bettercities.net/news-opinion/blogs/robert-steuteville/21157/ america-split-
between-two-community-ideals [http://perma.cc/WYQ5-7WMT]. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 See Byrne, supra note 27, at 1596-97 (describing the ideal neighborhoods envisioned by New 
Urbanists); cf. J. Peter Byrne, Two Cheers for Gentrification, 46 HOW. L.J. 405, 406 (2003) (arguing 
that “gentrification is good on balance for the poor and ethnic minorities” because it brings about 
more cohesive neighborhoods with necessary retail amenities, high property values, and thick social 
bonds). 
86 Speirs, supra note 52, at 27-29. 
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these new structures will be residential. An increase in the supply of housing 
results in a decrease in the price of housing. Further, LVT generally lowers 
property taxes on housing.87 Lower property taxes not only reduce the price 
of housing, but also make more people eligible to buy homes. When banks 
review mortgages, they include property tax payments in the cost of the 
mortgage payments, which means that higher property taxes lead to higher 
income requirements to qualify for a mortgage. Thus, a reduction in property 
taxes reduces the amount a borrower must earn to be eligible for a mortgage.88 
In sum, LVT promotes infill development by reducing the tax on 
buildings, which facilitates revitalization of urban spaces and creates 
incentives to replace and repair dilapidated buildings.89 Further, LVT induces 
property owners to build more densely by raising the costs of holding 
unproductive land.90 
2. Land Speculation and Farm Land Conversion 
Land Value Taxation has the ability to curb sprawl not only by 
incentivizing infill development but also by slowing the conversion of 
farmland into suburbs and even exurbs. It can even benefit family farmers. 
One of the major effects of suburban sprawl is the disappearance of 
American farmlands.91 A major cause of the evaporation of farmland is 
landowners speculating on suburban growth by buying large tracts of 
farmland, farming it sparingly, and hoping to reap a huge capital gain by 
selling to a suburban developer.92 Alanna Hartzok calls these speculators 
“real-estate farmers,”93 who cause sprawl by holding “out for high capital gains 
on acreage cheaply obtained years ago.”94 These real-estate farmers create a 
 
87 See, e.g., CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF ECON., LAND VALUE TAXATION: TITUSVILLE, 
PENNSYLVANIA 3 (2007), http://www.urbantoolsconsult.org/upload/Titusville%202007.pdf [http: 
//perma.cc/K9K8-HBNE] (finding that residential property taxes decreased by 5.57% after the city 
shifted to LVT). 
88 See Speirs, supra note 52, at 27-28 (estimating that the salary required to qualify for a 
mortgage on a $158,000 home [$150,000 structure value, $8000 land value] under a traditional 
property tax system is $40,500, but only $33,400 under LVT). 
89 Gihring, supra note 38, at 63-64. 
90 Id. at 63. 
91 Rick Rybeck, Tax Reform Motivates Sustainable Development, AM. INST. ARCHITECTS/D.C. 
NEWS, Dec. 1995–Jan. 1996, at 4, 4-5 (noting that as a result of sprawl, “undeveloped areas are too 
small and too scattered to support meaningful agricultural or conservation uses”). 
92 Mason Gaffney, Rising Inequality and Falling Property Tax Rates (showing empirically that 
large farms experience fewer improvements, and that one possible hypothesis explaining this is that 
larger plots are purchased as “place[s] to park slack money” rather than as vehicles for enterprise 
and development), in LAND OWNERSHIP AND TAXATION IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE 119 
(Gene Wunderlich ed. 1993). 
93 Hartzok, supra note 42, at 254. 
94 Id. at 249. 
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leap-frog pattern of suburban sprawl as they go farther and farther out to 
purchase cheap farmland and reap a capital gain.95 In the alternative and even 
more insidious case, 
Land near public infrastructure such as a subway station or major road 
intersection remains vacant or grossly underutilized because a landowner is 
waiting for a price in excess of what space users will pay today. This 
phenomenon forces developers to seek cheaper sites that are farther away 
from public infrastructure.96 
This leapfrog version of sprawl drives up the price of land at the urban 
fringe, making it more expensive for farmers to farm that land.97 As Hartzok 
explains: 
Sprawl penalizes farmers who want to raise crops rather than speculate and 
it discourages farm improvements on fringe land around cities. Sprawl drives 
up the price of land in rural areas. It also fuels land speculation while making 
it increasingly difficult to secure access to affordable land for farming 
operations.98 
Since 1930, there has been a sharp decline in property taxes on farmland.99 
While lowering taxes on farmland may on its face seem beneficial to farmers, 
the evidence suggests that it actually hurts farmers by lowering the holding 
costs of farmland.100 Although well-intentioned, this policy of lowering the 
holding costs of farmland creates incentives for increased land speculation and 
more urban sprawl.101 Accordingly, lower property tax rates correlate with 
larger farm size and less intensive use of farmland.102 
Lower property tax rates particularly hurt small farmers who are more 
likely to make capital improvements to land than larger corporate farmers. 
For example, Gaffney surveyed the nine states with the highest property taxes 
and the nine states with the lowest property taxes on farmland.103 He found, 
counterintuitively, that higher property taxes led to smaller farms, more 
 
95 See McIlwain, supra note 1 (explaining that the sustained rapid growth of the farthest edges 
of the suburbs may support the inference that under the current system, sprawl will continue to 
grow outward). 
96 Hartzok, supra note 42, at 250. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Gaffney, supra note 92, at 119-20 (showing a decrease in the national average of farm property 
tax rates from their peak of 1.32% in 1930 to 0.77% in 1945, before stabilizing at 0.85% in 1987). 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 120-24. 
102 Id. at 119. 
103 Id. at 128-31. 
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intensive farming, and higher investments in machinery and buildings.104 All 
of these attributes are characteristics of a family farm.105 He concluded that 
higher property taxes actually have an egalitarian effect despite the “negative 
incentive effects” caused by taking building value into account at all.106 He 
speculated that the egalitarian effect “would be stronger if the tax base was 
limited to naked land value, because the [land share of real estate value] rises 
steeply with size of farm. Untaxing buildings would also eliminate negative 
incentive effects.”107 Thus, LVT can also help slow sprawl at the suburban 
fringes by raising the holding cost for land speculators and creating incentives 
for more family farming. 
Hartzok explains how LVT attacks one of the causes of suburban sprawl: 
The economic incentives promoting sprawl can be partially explained by the 
unproductive way in which landowners earn money. Either a landowner can 
make money by developing a site and renting or selling it to someone who 
will use that development; or the owner can wait for population increases, 
wage increases, or improvements in public infrastructure to impart value to 
a site, which he can appropriate through a higher rent or sales price . . . . 
Landowners who underutilize valuable land sites with speculative intent 
thus contribute to sprawl and the costly, inefficient use of infrastructure.108 
LVT partially reverses these economic incentives in two ways. First, 
because it functions essentially as a user fee for land, it creates an incentive 
to use land rather than hold it unproductively for speculative gain. Second, it 
creates strong incentives not only to use farmland for agricultural purposes, 
but to make capital investments into the agricultural enterprise by decreasing 
the tax on capital improvements to land. 
In total then, LVT can slow sprawl both in urban cores, by creating strong 
incentives for increased density, and at the suburban fringes, by raising the 
cost of land speculation and giving family famers incentives to invest in 
improvements to their farms. 
III. LAND VALUE TAXATION AND THE METROPOLITAN REVOLUTION 
In their recent book, Bruce Katz and Jennifer Bradley boldly proclaim “[a] 
revolution is stirring in America. Like all revolutions, this one starts with a 
simple but profound truth: [C]ities and metropolitan areas are the engines of 
 
104 Id. at 128. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 131. 
107 Id. 
108 Hartzok, supra note 42, at 250. 
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economic prosperity and social transformation in the United States.”109 They 
explain that “[m]etros dominate because they embody concentration and 
agglomeration—networks of innovative firms, talented workers, risk-taking 
entrepreneurs, and supportive institutions that cluster together in 
metropolitan areas and coproduce economic performance and progress.”110 
Katz and Bradley contend “[t]he metro revolution reflects the maturing of 
U.S. cities and metros in terms of capacity and focus. Over the past three 
decades, these communities have innovated on the form of their places, 
regenerating downtowns, revitalizing waterfronts, restoring historic 
buildings, inspiring grand architecture, [and] expanding transit . . . .”111 
Moreover, metros are now “focusing on their function and the very shape and 
structure of their economies, taking on the core elements that drive 
economies: innovation, human capital, infrastructure, advanced industry.”112 
Given its ability to curb suburban sprawl, Land Value Taxation can be the 
shield, fuel, and product of this exciting revolution. 
A. Land Value Taxation as Shield and Fuel of the Metropolitan Revolution 
Sprawl threatens the core benefits of the Metropolitan Revolution: “Sprawl 
negates the purpose of cities, which is to let people live and work close together 
so as to utilize and enjoy the greatest efficiency of community facilities and 
enterprises.”113 The very fact that the metropolitan revolution is taking place is 
evidence of the beneficial effects of cities. As Katz and Bradley point out, “[o]ur 
nation’s top 100 metropolitan areas sit on only 12 percent of the nation’s land 
mass but are home to two-thirds of our population and generate 75 percent of 
 
109 BRUCE KATZ & JENNIFER BRADLEY, THE METROPOLITAN REVOLUTION: HOW CITIES 
AND METROS ARE FIXING OUR BROKEN POLITICS AND FRAGILE ECONOMY 1 (2013); see also 
Benton C. Martin, Federalism and Municipal Innovation: Lessons from the Fight Against Vacant Properties, 
46 URB. LAW. 361 (2014) (citing Katz and Bradley with approval and using their thesis to glean lessons 
from metro area collaborations to fight blight); Sheila A. Martin & Carolyn N. Long, Horizontal 
Intergovernmental Relations in the Portland Metropolitan Region: Challenges and Successes, 50 WILLAMETTE 
L. REV. 589, 591 (2014) (citing Katz and Bradley and applying their paradigm to the Portland area); 
Nancy Cook, When Cities and Suburbs Work Together, ATLANTIC (May 2, 2015), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/05/when-cities-and-suburbs-work-
together/391979/?utm_source=SFFB [http://perma.cc/PBU6-NWB6] (adding further evidence to 
Katz and Bradley’s theory by providing new examples of collaboration in New York and Denver 
delineating the problems caused by competition among cities within a metropolitan area). 
110 KATZ & BRADLEY, supra note 109, at 1. 
111 Id. at 4-5. 
112 Id. at 5. 
113 Hartzok, supra note 42, at 249. See generally EDWARD GLAESER, THE TRIUMPH OF THE 
CITY: HOW OUR GREATEST INVENTION MAKES US RICHER, SMARTER, GREENER, 
HEALTHIER, AND HAPPIER (2011) (arguing that the collaboration fostered by denser city dwelling 
produces more human prosperity). 
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our national GDP.”114 The benefits of living in close proximity to other 
intelligent and industrious people must be safeguarded, and LVT accomplishes 
this goal by discouraging suburban sprawl. Thus, LVT can be a shield for the 
Metropolitan Revolution by helping to ensure that the new prosperity created 
by metropolitan areas does not drive people out of those same metropolitan 
areas. This is a real concern given that high-income households represent the 
highest demand for low-density, sprawling development.115 
Similarly, LVT can fuel the metropolitan revolution by creating incentives 
for increased density. Further, LVT’s benefits are precisely in line with the 
goals of the Metropolitan Revolution: better, sturdier buildings, increased use 
of public transportation, more efficient utilization of land and infrastructure 
resources, increased low income housing supply, and more walkable and 
distinct neighborhoods. 
B. Land Value Taxation: A Product of the Metropolitan Revolution 
One key feature of the Metropolitan Revolution is that it is truly 
metropolitan: it is characterized by groups of jurisdictions within a single 
metro area collaborating rather than competing with one another.116 This is 
an encouraging development given that during the late twentieth century’s 
migration to the suburbs “individuals sought control over the development 
of their new communities, and coupled with the evolution of state law towards 
easier municipal incorporation, the existence of local [autonomous] 
governments exploded.”117 By 1992, there were an average of 113 local 
governments per metropolitan area.118 This massive proliferation of 
autonomous municipalities is born of localism, which is the “concept of legal 
and political empowerment of autonomous municipalities, as a response to 
the idea that regional or state influences undermine that autonomy during 
their decision-making processes.”119 The morass of autonomous local 
governments created by localism often leads to wasteful competition between 
municipalities and difficulty in providing solutions for problems best 
 
114 KATZ & BRADLEY supra note 109, at 1. 
115 Seong-Hoon Cho et al., Moderating Urban Sprawl Through Land Value Taxation 4 (Am. Agric. 
Econ. Ass’n, Selected Paper No. 468873, 2008), http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/ 
6150/2/468873.pdf [http://perma.cc/YL4X-34C8] (“[S]trong preferences for lower-density 
development among higher income households may exist.”) (citing P. Gordon & H.W. Richardson, 
Prove It, BROOKINGS REV., Fall 1998, at 23; Andrejs Skaburskis, Housing Prices and Housing Density: 
Do Higher Prices Make Cities More Compact?, 23 CANADIAN J. REGIONAL SCI. 455 (2000)). 
116 See KATZ & BRADLEY supra note 109, at 41-63 (detailing the Denver Metro’s transformation 
from a group of competing and parochial municipalities to a collaborative effort). 
117 Polmateer, supra note 2, at 1091 (citing Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of 
the Favored Quarter: Addressing the Barriers to New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985, 1992 (2000)). 
118 Id. at 1091. 
119 Id. 
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addressed at the regional level.120 In short, these local governments face a 
collective action problem: “Certain challenges can be addressed more 
effectively at a regional [or metropolitan] scale because individual local 
governments lack the capacity or resources to address certain issues without 
the cooperation of neighboring jurisdictions.”121 
Sprawl is one of these crucial areas where regional effort is needed to 
address a serious social problem.122 Polmateer argues convincingly that 
localism has proven a significant stumbling block for New Urbanism.123 He 
argues that even though most Americans live seamlessly in a metropolitan 
area, moving from one municipality to the next without suffering any effects 
from crossing jurisdictional lines, these independent municipalities have 
failed to connect those few New Urbanist developments that independent 
governments may succeed in creating.124 Polmateer contends “the failure of 
new urbanism lies in its inability to break free from localism’s isolationist 
tendencies and integrate these new urbanist developments into the 
surrounding region.”125 Polmateer posits: “[N]ew regionalism provides the 
missing piece to the proper implementation of new urbanism.”126 New 
regionalism comprises “any attempt to develop regional governance 
structures or interlocal cooperative agreements that better distribute regional 
benefits and burdens.”127 In short, new regionalism encourages exactly the sort 
of collaboration that Katz and Bradley trumpet as the touchstone of the 
Metropolitan Revolution. 
LVT is precisely the sort of growth management tool that is best 
implemented at a regional level. As we saw above, LVT has the power both 
to revitalize urban cores by creating more intense development and to stop 
suburban sprawl by decreasing the value of speculating on farmland. These 
twin results can only be maximized, however, at the regional level. It is not 
enough for the major city within a metro to implement LVT; this will only 
produce the infill prong of LVT’s sprawl-reducing power. Pittsburgh’s 
 
120 Cashin, supra note 117, at 2033 (suggesting that “robust regionalism . . . better distributes 
benefits and burdens”). 
121 LINDA MCCARTHY, U.S. ECON. DEV. ADMIN., COMPETITIVE REGIONALISM: BEYOND 
INDIVIDUAL COMPETITION 4 (2000). 
122 See Richard Briffault, Localism and Regionalism, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 21 (2000) (“Local issues 
like sprawl . . . may not be capable of successful resolution at the local level.”). 
123 Polmateer, supra note 2, at 1093. 
124 Id.; see also PETER CALTHORPE & WILLIAM FULTON, THE REGIONAL CITY: PLANNING 
FOR THE END OF SPRAWL 6 (2001) (“[W]e live in an aggregation of cities and suburbs: a metropolitan 
community that forms one economic, cultural, environmental, and civic entity . . . . The health of this 
new region depends on the interconnectedness of these [cities and suburbs] . . . .”). 
125 Polmateer, supra note 2, at 1093. 
126 Id. at 1094. 
127 Id. at 1130 (citing Lisa T. Alexander, The Promise and Perils of “New Regionalist” Approaches to 
Sustainable Communities, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 629, 632 (2011)). 
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experiment with LVT underscores this point. While the city itself showed a 
significant uptick in density and development after implementing LVT, the 
data is severely lacking as to LVT’s effect on the surrounding suburbs. 
Pittsburgh switched to a two-rate property tax system in 1979, raising the 
tax rate on land to five times that of improvements to land.128 In a comparative 
study of fifteen “rust belt” cities from 1980 to 1989, only two had an increased 
average annual value of building permits for commercial buildings: Columbus 
(15.43%) and Pittsburgh (70.43%).129 Pittsburgh is a “remarkable outlier; the 
real value of building permits on an annual basis rose by some 70 percent in 
the 1980s relative to the twenty-year period preceding the tax reform.”130 
Notably, much of Pittsburgh’s increased building value owed to a shortage of 
commercial space in the region.131 Nevertheless, the reliance on increased 
land taxation played an important supporting role in stimulating 
development.132 
Similarly, a survey of the handful of Pennsylvania municipalities (including 
Pittsburgh) that implemented LVT showed that a split-rate tax system resulted 
in a three to four percent increase in the value of residential construction 
permits.133 And finally, a 1992 study found a strong correlation between building 
density and split-rate taxation.134 Thus, it appears individual municipalities can 
employ LVT’s ability to encourage infill development. 
If, however, only a few municipalities in a metro area adopt LVT, its 
power to stop land speculation at the suburban fringe will not be 
appropriately exploited. To be sure, increased density in and around central 
business districts might relieve some pressure on the far suburbs by 
decreasing the demand for housing.135 Developers might even have an 
incentive to build in the municipality with LVT given the preferential 
treatment of improvements. Speculators, however, will not be deterred 
because the demand for large, low-density housing is greatest among high-
 
128 Oates & Schwab, supra note 65, at 1, 9. 
129 Id. at 42 tbl.3. 
130 Id. at 12. 
131 Id. at 9, 20. 
132 Id. at 22. 
133 See, e.g., Florenz Plassmann & T. Nicolaus Tideman, A Markov Chain Monte Carlo Analysis 
of the Effect of Two-Rate Property Taxes on Construction, 47 J. URB. ECON. 216 (2000). 
134 Kenneth M. Lusht, The Site Value Tax and Residential Development (1992) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with the University of Virginia Law Library) (avoiding reverse causality 
problems by reducing sample to twenty-eight suburban communities that had substantial amounts 
of developable land available at the time these communities adopted split-rate taxation). 
135 See, e.g., Hartzok, supra note 42, at 251 (“By encouraging development within the existing 
urbanized areas, the two-rate property tax counteracts sprawl and land speculation, and thereby 
decreases development pressures and escalation of land prices on nearby farmlands and rural areas.”). 
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income individuals.136 Therefore, demand for large homes on large plots at 
the suburban fringes will still exist. The pattern of leapfrog development will 
continue unabated unless appropriate disincentives are put in place. As 
demonstrated, LVT represents one such disincentive. Its effect, however, will 
be diminished unless the entire region implements it. Doing so would raise 
the costs of farmland speculation across the entire metro region and force the 
development of adequate, medium-density housing in the regions 
surrounding the central business district. 
Without the sort of regional collaboration promised by the Metropolitan 
Revolution, LVT’s potential to reign in sprawl will not be realized. LVT can 
moderate the demand for open space at the fringes of metro areas by using “a 
sliding land value tax . . . targeting ‘critical’ sprawl areas.”137 But implementing 
such a sliding scale that targets critical sprawl areas by raising the tax rate on land 
will require massive collaboration among the varied municipalities that comprise 
the outer rims of metro areas. These municipalities will not only need to share 
data, but they must also be willing to raise land tax rates to slow sprawl within 
their borders and force it into neighboring jurisdictions. This will require a level 
of trust and cooperation as yet unseen. 
This shifting approach is like herding sheep: the sheep are sprawl, and the 
dog is LVT. LVT needs to be constantly shifting around the perimeter of the 
sprawl to keep it hemmed in. Such a massive collaborative effort can only be 
the result of the Metropolitan Revolution and a growing awareness among 
suburban municipalities that what is good for the region as a whole is good 
for the individual municipality.138 Controlling sprawl will lead to an increased 
tax base, stop the drain of human capital, and lead to a more efficient 
utilization of municipal resources.139 
To summarize, for LVT to have a maximal halting effect on sprawl, it must 
be implemented both in the major city within a metro area as well as in the 
surrounding suburban municipalities on a sliding scale targeting key sprawl 
areas. This effort will require tremendous collaboration by the municipalities 
within a given metro area. While this level of cooperation is unprecedented, 
the Metropolitan Revolution provides evidence and hope that it is not out of 
reach. 
 
136 See Cho et al., supra note 115, at 4 (“[S]trong preferences for lower-density development 
among higher income households may exist.”). 
137 Id. at 7. 
138 See Polmateer, supra note 2, at 1112 (explaining that localism leads to competitive behavior 
among neighboring municipalities even though “no locality is actually isolated because what happens 
in one area has a direct effect on its neighbors.”); see also Cook, supra note 109 (discussing the benefits 
of regional collaboration in Denver, where “[t]he city and its surrounding suburbs had to decide that 
working together was preferable to struggling separately”). 
139 Cook, supra note 109. 
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CONCLUSION 
The tremendous progress made by New Urbanists in reforming the single-
use zoning codes that impede their ability to create the neighborhoods for 
which they advocate provides an opportunity for the movement to reflect on 
other obstacles to its agenda. Our current single tier property tax system is just 
such an obstacle because it creates strong incentives for sprawling development. 
A switch to Land Value Taxation (LVT) can undo these perverse incentives. 
Land Value Taxation, however, would be most effective if implemented at the 
regional/metropolitan level because sprawl is a regional problem requiring a 
regional response. By following the lead of the Metropolitan Revolution and 
collaborating to implement LVT, the many jurisdictions comprising a 
metropolitan area can fully capitalize on LVT’s twin ability to encourage infill 
development and slow suburban land speculation. In sum, LVT is a promising 
new avenue for creating New Urbanist communities. 
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